The philosophical reflection on the Remarks on Colors is developed at the intersection of grammar and phenomenology. And it is indeed a rich reflection: it directly touches on the notorious issue of the interplay between the available color vocabulary and the color repertoire that one is capable of seeing (with many comments on how color blindness can stand as an alternative repertoire of perceiving colored objects); at the same time, it challenges the imagination by asking us to conceive what could count, for example, as "transparent white" (e.g., a transparent white glass) — and if we cannot, to explain why. The reader is thus invited to see the Remarks on Colors as a challenge to their imagination and an invitation to pay attention not only to what their eyes see but also to the logic that governs the qualitative characteristics of their discourse about what is seen, about the subtle shades that are detected, about the morphological differences underlying this very everyday and commonplace phenomenon — the perception of colors.