The Asia Minor Campaign is undoubtedly the most ambitious endeavor in modern Greek history, an endeavor that collapsed with a resounding failure, territorial mutilation, a hecatomb of victims, and the displacement of over 1,000,000 people. But is the failure of the entire venture due only to its difficulty or also to the internal contradictions of a politically, socially, and geographically divided nation? Did these contradictions arise solely from ideological and political reasons or primarily from the fear of the inhabitants of Old Greece about the inevitable shift of the decision-making center to the New Lands? Would a more prudent policy have ensured the uninterrupted stay of the Asia Minor Hellenism in their ancestral homes or even more the annexation of Thrace, both Eastern and Western?
Far from Manichaean approaches of traitors-patriots, conspiracy theories against the isolated nation, and theories of imperialist war, we will see the main reasons that led to the initiation and continuation of the Asia Minor Campaign - and indeed with greater intensity by its initial critics when they came to power, an action that can hardly be attributed to the usual breach of pre-election promises. The author also points out a contradiction that he believes prevails in a large part of the scientific community: the particularly daring (until 1917) decision for Greece's participation in World War I is applauded, while the claim of the Smyrna region - the only stable compensation offered for this participation - is condemned, and the annexation of Thrace is seen as self-evident. Finally, he highlights the indirect connection of the Asia Minor Catastrophe with the other two major tragedies, the Cyprus issue and the Civil War.